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The role of earnout financing on the valuation effects of global diversification 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of earnout financing on the value of acquiring firms engaged in Cross-
Border Acquisitions (CBAs), using a dataset of UK, US, Canadian and Australian firms from 1992 to 
2012. The results show that firms initiating international business operations via earnout-financed CBAs 
enhance their value more than acquirers in (a) domestic acquisitions and (b) remaining CBAs by 
established Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Our findings demonstrate the superiority of earnout 
financing in CBAs announced by acquirers that have no prior international business experience. The 
results are robust to the firms’ endogenous choice to diversify globally and to the use of earnout 
financing. We contend that earnouts contribute to the reduction of valuation risk faced by firms acquiring 
a foreign target firm for the first time. Our empirical findings contribute to the existing debate on the 
merit of international expansion through CBAs and the role of earnout contingent payment. 
 
Keywords: cross-border acquisitions (CBAs); First-Time CBAs (FTCBAs); Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) and Enterprises (MNEs); contingent earnouts; event study. 
 
JEL Classifications: G34, F23, F21, G15. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While international expansion through Cross-Border Acquisitions (CBAs) may provide companies with 
valuable benefits of international diversification and access to new markets, such transactions also 
expose acquirers to significant merger-valuation risks. In this paper, we explore the extent to which the 
use of contingent payment in the form of earnout financing may help alleviate these risks, leading to 
higher acquiring-firm value. Earnouts constitute a contingent payment device whereby payment is made 
to the seller of the acquired firm in at least two stages: an up-front payment, and one or more future 
(deferred) payment(s) conditional upon the acquired firm achieving pre-agreed performance goals 
within a pre-determined time period. 
The international operations of firms originating in developed economies have increased rapidly 
in recent decades, with CBAs serving as the dominant mode. CBAs as a proportion of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&As) activity have risen from below 15% of total M&A volume in 1992 to over 32% 
in 2012, and in 2007 the value of CBAs worldwide reached $1,197bn, compared to only $39bn in 1987 
(UNCTAD, 2009). Reflecting the importance of CBAs in shaping modern Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) and Enterprises (MNEs), a substantial literature has emerged investigating whether CBAs 
affect the value of the acquiring firm.1 However, despite the popularity of such deals, the vast majority 
of studies show that acquirers engaged in CBAs create lower value relative to their domestic 
counterparts.2 
The wealth effects of CBAs are, however, likely to vary according to the prior international 
business experience or extent of global diversification of the acquiring firm (Errunza & Senbet, 1981; 
Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Shimizu et al., 2004; Gande et al., 2009). Along these lines, the seminal 
contribution of Doukas & Travlos (1988) reveals that firms initiating their international business 
operations by entering a foreign country for the first time in their business history via a CBA (First-
Time CBAs, or FTCBAs), or enlarging their existing international business activities via CBAs (Not-
First-Time CBAs, or NFTCBAs) in a new country, regardless of their existing transnational presence, 
increase firm value. The authors attribute this to the enhancement of a firm’s multinational network, 
which augments its global diversification, enhances its cost savings from joint production in marketing 
and manufacturing, and perhaps offers more favourable tax schemes and growth opportunities which 
are unique to those new countries. Given their lack of international business experience in evaluating 
and acquiring targets beyond their national borders, FTCBAs are, however, exposed to higher merger 
valuation challenges than remaining CBAs by established MNCs. (Doukas & Travlos, 1988). Aybar & 
Ficici (2009) further argue that FTCBAs lack local knowledge to even identify investment opportunities 
in the host country.  
More recently, studies show that the acquiring firm’s exposure to merger-valuation risk, primarily 
originating from information asymmetry, can be effectively mitigated, if not solved, via earnout 
financing. This financing mechanism, relative to single up-front payments in cash or stock, should more 
effectively help merging firms in integration-challenging CBAs to secure higher synergies as: (a) it 
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addresses adverse selection during the merger negotiation period, and (b) it enhances managerial 
commitment in the post-acquisition or integration period (Kohers & Ang, 2000). The designated 
properties of earnouts seem to be more suitable in CBAs, perhaps even more so in FTCBAs, than in 
domestic M&As, given the larger degree of valuation uncertainties embedded in the former groups. 
There is, however, limited evidence regarding the valuation effects of earnout financing for international 
investment in general, and in particular for FTCBAs and NFTCBAs separately.3 It therefore remains an 
open question as to whether the benefits of initiating or expanding existing international business 
operations are shaped by the deal payment being contingent upon the target’s future performance 
through earnout financing. This paper fills this gap. 
The analysis is based on 31,848 domestic and foreign target M&A announcements between 1992 
and 2012 (inclusive) by acquirers from four countries with extensive use of earnout financing: the UK, 
the US, Canada and Australia. We employ standard event-study methodology to measure the impact of 
each announcement on firm value. Methodological issues pertinent to self-selection bias concerns 
regarding the firm’s endogenous decision to diversify internationally (or not) and the decision to use 
earnout financing (or not) are addressed using the Heckman two-stage procedure and the Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) technique augmented with the Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity method. 
Our findings strongly indicate that earnout-financed CBAs have a significant positive impact on 
firm value only when the acquirers have no previous international business experience. FTCBAs 
financed with earnouts create more value than domestic deals financed either with earnouts or single 
up-front payments in cash or stock. Within the CBA context alone, FTCBAs using earnouts enhance 
firm value more than (a) FTCBAs financed with cash, (b) existing MNCs acquiring into new markets 
(NFTCBA_NEW), irrespective of the choice of the single up-front payment, and (c) existing MNCs 
acquiring in markets where they already have foreign operations (NFTCBA_SAME), again irrespective 
of the choice of the single up-front payment. Our findings from the univariate analysis, and the 
multivariate analysis on a cross-sectional sample of firms derived after controlling for potential self-
selection bias concerns, offer evidence of the superiority of earnout in CBAs announced by acquirers 
without any prior international business experience. We find that the benefits to FTCBAs of using 
earnout financing are higher in four circumstances: (i) where the target firm is unlisted, (ii) where the 
cultural or geographical distance between the acquiring and the target firm’s domicile is large, (iii) when 
acquiring in countries where the regulatory quality is high, or (iv) when expanding internationally into 
emerging markets – arguably the category of CBAs with the highest level of inherent risks.4 Having 
controlled for the earnout effect this extends earlier studies, such as Chari et al. (2010), that suggest that 
acquirers based in developed markets enhance value through CBAs only when they acquire targets in 
emerging markets. 
We also examine the impact of other factors likely to influence firm value in the multivariate 
analysis. Our results are also robust to acquirer-country fixed effects, target-industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. Likewise, they are robust to the firm’s endogenous choice to diversify internationally 
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(CBAs in general, FTCBAs, NFTCBAs and sub-groups) and to employ earnout. 
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we add to evidence suggesting that the costs 
and benefits of international business expansion are not uniform across all CBAs. We find that they 
depend not only on the extent of the acquiring firm’s level of global diversification, but also on whether 
earnout financing is used. Second, while prior earnout studies have focused on acquisitions by either US 
or UK acquirers, this is the first paper to analyse the role of earnout in Australia or Canada. Third, our 
analysis builds on the findings of Reuer et al. (2004) that suggest that firms lacking international M&A 
experience turn to contingent pay-outs, particularly when purchasing targets in intangible-rich sectors. 
Finally, we add to the understanding of the determinants of firm value in the context of domestic 
vs. foreign target M&As, and in particular the role of earnout. Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) illustrate 
that deals leading to an increase in global diversification are associated with lower firm value relative 
to their domestic counterparts. Denis et al. (2002) find a significant discount for globally diversified 
firms, which are (often) associated with agency problems and free-cash-flow considerations (Jensen, 
1986). Mantecon (2009) shows that the use of earnouts benefits predominately domestic acquirers rather 
than those that acquire foreign targets. In this paper, we show that these results are specific to earnout-
financed NFTCBAs in a new foreign market (NFTCBA_NEW), or in a country where they already have 
prior operations (NFTCBA_SAME), where earnouts contribute less to the acquiring firm’s value. This 
is due to two possible factors: (a) the earnout’s limited impact in reducing merger-valuation risk when 
the acquirer has prior foreign target acquisition experience, an argument that is stronger in 
NFTCBA_SAME given the acquirers’ local market knowledge, and (b) the limited enhancement of 
global diversification, as the acquiring firm is exposed to no further (the case of NFTCBA_SAME) or 
limited (the case of NFTCBA_NEW) global diversification. However, in the case of FTCBAs, where 
neither (a) nor (b) holds, the impact of earnout is much stronger. There appears to be no prior literature 
on whether the role of earnout in CBAs varies with the extent of the acquirer’s global diversification. 
Overall, our results show that firms, particularly when acquiring abroad for the first time, tend to 
benefit significantly from using the earnout payment mechanism. Thus, they have important practical 
implications for managers of companies contemplating expanding internationally. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the salient literature and presents the 
theoretical considerations of international expansion, earnout financing and firm value. The subsequent 
sections set out the testable hypotheses, outline the methods used to conduct the empirical analysis, 
provide a description of the data employed, and discuss our main findings. The final section concludes. 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION, EARNOUT FINANCING AND FIRM VALUE: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The main argument in this paper builds on simple theoretical predictions. International business 
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initiations that are announced by firms without any prior international experience (i.e., FTCBAs), or 
those announced by established MNCs not operating in the target firm’s domicile (i.e., 
NFTCBA_NEW), expose the acquiring firm to significant target-valuation risk (Doukas & Travlos, 
1988). This risk is often associated with asymmetric information between the merging firms, which 
takes two main forms: first, one or both merging firms may hold private knowledge on their valuation 
which is not ex-ante transparent to the other – a case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge; second, 
one or both merging firms can take an action ex-post that may harm the other – a case of moral hazard 
or hidden action. Accordingly, information asymmetry, concerning predominantly the financial position 
and performance of the target firm, gives rise to the adverse selection problem, whereas future 
uncertainty about the commitment of the target firm’s management to delivering the expected merger 
payoffs gives rise to the moral hazard problem.5 While all acquirers are likely to face these risks, firms 
that initiate transnational business operations are both more exposed, and also potentially more sensitive, 
to them. 
Studies have shown that the adverse selection risk in M&As can be reduced by the judicious choice 
of payment method (Hansen, 1987; Eckbo et al., 1990; Huang et al., 2016). For the acquirer engaged in 
a cash-financed deal, and for both the acquirer and target engaged in a stock-exchange deal, information 
asymmetry creates valuation uncertainty, and leads them to demand a discount to the apparent value of 
the acquiring or the target firm (Travlos, 1987; Eckbo et al., 1990). Firm value is therefore expected to 
be significantly higher in cash-financed than in stock-financed deals, for both the acquirer and the target 
(Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006). In theory, a cash offer is made by acquirers who 
attach a high value to the target firm under their control, and by so doing signal their confidence that the 
target will be of high value during the post-merger period (Fishman, 1989). Less confident acquirers, 
however, prefer stock financing. 
Neither cash nor stock single up-front payment can factor the post-acquisition performance of the 
target into the deal value,6 while the earnout payment mechanism does.7 Extant evidence suggests that 
the demand for earnout financing is the outcome of significant disagreements between the merging firms 
over the payoff of the merger. As a result, we predict that the impact of earnout in merger outcomes to 
vary considerably across M&As given this demand, which is likely to be shaped by the acquirer’s 
experience in undertaking CBAs (Reuer et al., 2004) or with the acquirer’s existing level of global 
diversification. Rationality would suggest that smaller and younger acquiring firms, those involved in 
industry-diversifying deals, those that merge with targets operating in highly intangible-rich sectors, 
those that enjoy extreme growth potential, and perhaps those that are expanding into emerging markets, 
are more likely to welcome the earnout financing (Kohers & Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 2011). These 
characteristics are common among CBAs announced by firms acquiring a foreign target for the first 
time in their business history. Thus, whether earnouts in FTCBAs affect firm value, or, perhaps more 
precisely, whether they enhance firm value more than in cases in which single up-front payments in cash 
or stock are employed, remains an important issue to address. 
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In an earnout-financed deal, payment is made in at least two stages: an up-front payment to the 
target firm of a large fraction of the deal value at the time of the deal announcement, and a relatively 
smaller payment (i.e., the earnout payment), the settlement of which is contingent upon the post-merger 
performance of the target firm. Therefore, earnouts should mitigate the moral hazard problem by 
incentivising the target firm’s management to commit to successfully running the target firm in the post-
acquisition period. The first-stage payment can be in the form of cash, stock or a mixture of these and 
other securities. The second- or subsequent-stage payment(s) (as noted by Faccio & Masulis (2005) and 
Barbopoulos et al. (2017), often made in cash) is made over the earnout period and upon the target 
reaching pre-agreed milestones. The contingent form of consideration seeks to avoid both the adverse 
selection problem (i.e., ex-ante overvaluation of the target firm due to the target firm’s managers hiding 
‘bad’ information regarding the ‘intrinsic’ value of the firm), and the ex-post moral hazard problem (i.e., 
contract failure due to a party shirking or inability to enforce contract compliance and performance 
delivery), thus contributing to the reduction in merger-valuation risk.8 
Evidence relating to the impact of earnout on the acquiring firm’s value is limited. The seminal 
paper of Kohers & Ang (2000) shows that earnout-financed deals yield positive short and long run value 
gains for acquiring firms. These gains are superior to those realised in deals financed with single up-
front payments in cash or stock. Datar et al. (2001) show that foreign-target acquirers use earnout less 
frequently than domestic-target ones. They argue that the managers of foreign targets appear to be 
unwilling to accept deferred payments, owing to possible future conflicts arising from the discrepancies 
in calculations of the payment amount and performance goals, and differences in accounting practices 
and other corporate governance mechanisms. Mantecon (2009) shows that the use of earnouts benefits 
predominately domestic rather than foreign target acquirers. Cain et al. (2011) examine the determinants 
of earnout use in deals involving US firms, and show that the size and length of the earnout contract are 
greater when the uncertainty surrounding the value of the target is higher. Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam 
(2012) show that UK acquirers using earnouts enjoy higher short and long run value gains compared to 
single up-front payments. Cadman et al. (2014) document variations in initial earnout fair-value 
estimates and earnout fair-value adjustments that correspond with motivations to resolve moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems, bridge valuation gaps and retain target-firm managers. Earnouts often 
stipulate the retention of the target firm’s managers during the post-acquisition period, and Cadman et 
al. (2014) provide evidence that target managers stay longer with the firm after the acquisition when 
earnouts are included primarily to retain them. As such, the retention of valuable human capital can 
reduce problems associated with integrating the merged entities in the post-acquisition period. This is 
perhaps more relevant in FTCBAs in which the acquirer has no experience in acquiring a foreign target 
firm. Lastly, Barbopoulos et al. (2017) show that the gains of US acquirers in earnout-financed M&As 
are sensitive to the method of payment (i.e., cash, stock, combo, or mixed) employed in the initial and 
deferred payment stages. 
Overall, CBAs announced by FTCBAs are exposed to significantly higher merger-valuation-risk 
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than existing MNCs. This is somewhat compared to those with some prior local market knowledge 
(NFTCBA_SAME), and arguably closer to those with prior CBA experience entering new markets 
(NFTCBA_NEW). While earnouts may not be suitable in all circumstances (such as when the target’s 
standalone performance cannot be measured or when there is influence by the acquirer on that 
performance such as when there is significant structural integration between the merging firms), earnout 
financing seems to offer a well-calibrated solution for FTCBAs by reducing valuation risks through the 
elimination of both adverse selection and moral hazard issues. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to analysing the impact of earnout financing on acquirer value and how it varies according 
to the acquiring firm’s degree of global diversification, we examine several specific factors that prior 
international business literature suggests are likely to influence the acquiring firm’s value in CBAs (for 
reviews, see Gande et al., 2009; Aybar and Ficici, 2009). These are grouped in two main classes: ‘Deal- 
and Firm-Specific Factors’, and ‘Target-Country-Specific Factors’. 
 
Deal- and Firm-Specific Factors and Firm Value 
The earnout-financed first-time CBA hypothesis follows from our discussion presented in the 
Theoretical Considerations section. FTCBAs lack the necessary international business experience and 
knowledge that is specific to the host country, resulting in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
These problems are likely to be aggravated if there are legal and regulatory differences, lack of 
comparable accounting information about the target firm, language, cultural or organisational 
differences in the merging firms’ countries, or lack of (or unfamiliarity with) infrastructure to carry out 
extensive due diligence, which are perhaps exacerbated when the distance between the merging firms’ 
countries is large. Additionally, FTCBAs are often small or young firms that are likely to merge with 
targets operating in highly intangible-rich sectors, and thus are likely to be more sensitive to merger-
valuation errors than NFTCBAs. Nevertheless, FTCBAs are likely to enjoy significant value gains from 
the enhancement of the acquiring firm’s global diversification, higher cost savings from joint production 
in marketing and manufacturing, and perhaps more favourable tax schemes and growth opportunities. 
Markides & Ittner (1994) and Doukas (1995) argue that these benefits are greater when the firm expands 
into a less developed country. 
As noted in the Theoretical Considerations section, earnout financing can contribute to the 
reduction of the FTCBA’s exposure to the abovementioned valuation risks. This is due to the increase 
of information sharing between the merging firms and the higher likelihood of retaining the target firm’s 
management team in the post-acquisition period. Being familiar with the business environment of the 
target firm’s country and committed to maximising performance to ultimately receive the deferred 
payment, the target management team is incentivised to boost the merger payoff. Hence, we develop the 
following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1a: Earnout-financed cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) announced by first-time 
CBAs (FTCBAs) outperform domestic M&As financed with either earnout or single up-front 
payments. 
Hypothesis 1b: Earnout-financed FTCBAs outperform other CBAs (i.e., not-first-time CBAs 
or NFTCBAs) whether entering new markets (NFTCBA_NEW) or acquiring in a foreign 
market where they have previously acquired a target (NFTCBA_SAME) financed with either 
earnout or single up-front payments. 
 
The type of target firm’s ownership structure (i.e., unlisted vs. listed) has received significant attention 
in previous studies regarding its impact on the acquiring firm’s value. Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. 
(2002), among others, show that private (public) target M&As enhance (diminish) the acquiring firm’s 
value, yet this is highly sensitive to the deal’s payment method. Moeller & Schlingemann (2005) further 
confirm these findings in CBAs. These studies contend that due to (a) the limited access to external 
financing of private firms, and (b) the low competition for private firms (due to the limited information 
availability for private firms), M&As of private target firms result in lower takeover premiums and 
higher acquirer abnormal returns. Similarly, the simplicity of the ownership structure of a private firm 
decreases the takeover premium due to the need to satisfy the interests of only a focused group of 
stakeholders in the target firm (Choi & Russell, 2004; Aybar & Ficici, 2009). 
On the other hand, the takeover premiums associated with unlisted target FTCBAs should be higher 
to reflect the higher merger-valuation risk. Such higher takeover premiums are therefore likely to 
decrease the acquiring firm’s value unless the merger-valuation risk is effectively controlled and the 
post-acquisition benefits are securely enhanced. As stated in the Theoretical Considerations section, 
earnout financing could offer a well-calibrated solution via the effective control of such risks, which 
leads to a reduction in the takeover premiums associated with FTCBAs (as a result of the lower discount 
to the apparent value of the firm) and hence, enhance firm value. The use of earnout financing is 
therefore expected to enhance value creation in unlisted target FTCBAs. Hence, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Unlisted target earnout-financed FTCBAs outperform other CBA counterparts 
(i.e., NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME) financed with either earnout or single up-front 
payments. 
 
 
Target-Country-Specific Factors and Firm Value 
We consider two factors that are likely to affect the acquiring firm’s value in FTCBAs: (i) the cultural 
and geographical distance between home and host countries and, (ii) the legal environment in the host 
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country. 
 
The cultural and geographical distance between home and host countries in CBAs can add to the 
valuation challenges for the acquiring firm and increase the post-acquisition integration costs (Ambros 
& Håkanson, 2014). Although there is a debate around the role of cultural difference in investment 
decisions (Tihanyi et al., 2005), the main dimension in the debate remains on whether the cultural 
distance affects the performance of MNCs and hence firm value (Shenkar, 2001; Barbopoulos et al., 
2014). High cultural distance can inflate the initial cost of entry into the host country and the post-
investment integration costs, and perhaps lead to significant intra-organizational conflicts and poor 
implementation of business plans (Tihanyi et al., 2005). Thus, the cultural distance between the merging 
firms’ countries is a potential liability to the firm’s value (Zaheer, 1995). We use Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions (power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and individualism) and the method 
proposed by Kogut and Singh (1988) to calculate the cultural distance between the merging firms’ 
countries. 
We hypothesise that both the valuation challenges and the post-acquisition integration costs faced 
by FTCBAs should be positively correlated with the cultural and geographic difference between the 
merging firms’ countries. As stated in the Theoretical Considerations section, the greater the merger-
valuation challenges, the more earnout financing should enhance value creation in CBAs. Therefore, 
earnout financing in general, and in FTCBAs in particular, should have an increasingly positive impact 
on the value creation the larger the cultural and geographical distances between the merging firms’ 
countries are. In light of this discussion, we set out the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Earnout-financed FTCBAs outperform their counterparts financed with single 
up-front payments when the cultural distance between merging firms’ countries is higher. 
Hypothesis 3b: Earnout-financed FTCBAs outperform their counterparts financed with single 
up-front payments when the geographical distance between merging firms’ countries is larger. 
 
The legal system of the target firm’s country is expected to play a fundamental role in the success of 
earnout-financed FTCBA deals, as their effectiveness largely depends on legal and regulatory 
impediments and the enforceability of contracts. Barbopoulos et al. (2017) find evidence consistent with 
this argument, contending that the ability of earnouts to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems depends on the legal system in the target firm’s domicile and its effectiveness. Kohers & Ang 
(2000), Datar et al. (2001) and Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam (2012) offer similar conclusions. Along 
these lines, recent international business literature highlights the impact of the legal system in the 
merging firms’ countries on firm value. Ellis et al. (2017), for example, show that the acquirer value 
increases with the governance distance between the acquirer and the target, which is measured via, 
among others, the rule of law and the regulatory quality. Lastly, Renneboog et al. (2017) show that 
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country-level differences in legal (creditor) protection affect firm value in CBAs. We therefore expect 
the impact on firm value of earnout financing in FTCBAs to vary with the strength of the legal system 
in the target country. We measure the strength of the legal system and legal enforcement of contracts 
using the indices of La Porta et al. (1997), the Fraser Institute, and Kaufmann et al. (2010). Hence, we 
set out the following final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Earnout-financed FTCBAs outperform their remaining CBA counterparts 
financed with either earnout or single up-front payments when the legal system of the target 
firm’s country of residence is relatively strong. 
 
METHODS 
Measurement of Abnormal Returns 
In this paper, firm value is proxied by the acquirer abnormal returns. The commonly used methods to 
estimate abnormal returns in response to a corporate takeover announced by an acquiring firm 𝑖𝑖 require 
a long time-series, or a window of returns of the acquiring firm 𝑖𝑖 that needs to be free of the effect of 
other firm-specific events announced from the same firm 𝑖𝑖 within the estimation period. However, our 
sample is composed of many deals, some of which are announced by frequent acquirers within short 
periods. Therefore, standard asset-pricing methods may not be appropriate. In line with numerous 
previous studies addressing similar concerns (e.g., Fuller et al., 2002; Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam, 2012; 
Danbolt & Maciver, 2012), in our main analysis the short run abnormal returns for an acquiring firm 𝑖𝑖 
in response to a merger announcement are estimated using the market-adjusted model (MAM), as shown 
in Equation (1): 
  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is the abnormal return to acquirer 𝑖𝑖 on day 𝑡𝑡, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log stock return of acquirer 𝑖𝑖 on day 
𝑡𝑡, and 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the value-weighted market log return index (of the acquiring firm’s country) on day 𝑡𝑡.9 
The announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR ) for acquirer 𝑖𝑖  is the sum of the 
abnormal returns over a five-day window (𝑡𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡𝑡 + 2) surrounding the deal’s announcement day, 
𝑡𝑡 = 0, as shown in Equation (2): 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+2
𝑖𝑖−2
 (2) 
 
Univariate and Multivariate Analysis 
First, the announcement period CARs are analysed according to type of M&A (i.e., domestic, CBA, 
FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME) and the use or not of earnout financing. To assess the 
comparative performance of different groups of acquirers, the difference in mean CAR is tested. 
We then examine the above interactions, along with several other control variables, in a 
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multivariate framework. The following equation (3) is estimated: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖        𝑖𝑖 = 1 …𝑁𝑁 (3) 
where the intercept 𝛼𝛼  denotes the acquiring firm’s value after accounting for the effects of all the 
explanatory variables entering the information set 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. The dependent variable, 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, is the five-day 
announcement period acquirer 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 (Equation (2)). The matrix of explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, includes 
several factors known to affect the acquiring firm’s value; the impact of each is gathered in the vector 
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗. These variables are presented below in two main categories: the deal- and firm-specific factors and 
the country-specific ones. 
 
Variables 
Previous research shows that the acquiring firm’s value is sensitive to the choice of payment mechanism 
(Kohers & Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos et al., 2017). Therefore, to account for the implications of the 
payment mechanism on acquirer value, a dummy variable is included in equation (3), which is assigned 
the value of 1 if earnout financing is included in the deal (=Earnout), and 0 otherwise (=single up-front 
payment in cash, stock or a mixture of cash and stock). To account for the impact of foreign acquisitions 
on acquirer value, we include in equation (3) a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is 
foreign (=CBA), and 0 otherwise (=Domestic). We also aim to account for the impact of the extent of 
acquirer global diversification (Errunza & Senbet, 1981; Gange et al., 2009), and hence to test whether 
the firm value and role of contingent payment in the form of earnout financing varies with the acquirer’s 
prior local knowledge of the foreign target market. Thus, dummy variables are included that are assigned 
the value of 1 if the acquiring firm acquires a target abroad for the first time (=FTCBA), if the acquiring 
firm already has foreign operations and enters a new market (=NFTCBA_NEW), or if the acquiring firm 
already has operations in a foreign market and announces a subsequent deal in the same market 
(=NFTCBA_SAME), and 0 otherwise, respectively. When classifying deals as FTCBAs, we ensure that 
the acquiring firm has not engaged in any prior international acquisition of assets, such as divestitures 
or minority stakes. 
Lastly, the international business and finance literature provides ample evidence on the influence 
of the target firm’s listing status (i.e., unlisted vs. listed) on the acquiring firm’s value (Chang, 1998; 
Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006). A dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is an 
unlisted firm (=Unlisted Target), and 0 otherwise (=Listed Target) is therefore added in equation (3). 
As stated in the Hypotheses Development section, the merger-valuation risk, but mostly the post-
acquisition integration cost for the acquirer, is likely to increase with the cultural distance between the 
respective countries. To account for the impact of the cultural distance (CD), in equation (3) we use 
Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions (power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism) and the method proposed by Kogut & Singh (1988), to calculate the cultural distance as 
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shown in equation (4): 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = ∑ ��𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂�
2
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
�4𝑖𝑖=1 4  (4) 
where: 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 denotes the index for the 𝛪𝛪th cultural dimension and 𝑗𝑗th (target) country, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is the variance of 
the index of the 𝛪𝛪th dimension, 𝜂𝜂 indicates the acquirer country, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the cultural distance of the 
𝑗𝑗th country from the acquirer country.10 
Ambros & Håkanson (2014) argue that distance, whether geographical or cultural, between the 
home and host countries affects a firm’s performance when entering or operating in foreign markets. 
Lack of a common language can also be expected to add to the complexity and cost of identifying, 
evaluating, negotiating and integrating targets across national borders. However, Morosini et al. (1998) 
find cultural distance to have a positive impact on acquiring firm’s value. Following prior literature on 
internationalisation and CBAs, we control for cultural distance (Morosini et al., 1998), geographical 
distance between acquirer and target countries (Conconi et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017), the existence of 
a common border (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008), and the existence of a common language (Conconi 
et al., 2016; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). 
Prior literature has also found numerous country variables to affect acquirer firm value in CBA; 
we control for the main ones in equation (3). Some studies (e.g., Bris & Cabolis, 2008; Barbopoulos et 
al., 2012; Ellis et al., 2017; Renneboog et al., 2017) suggest that the target-firm country’s legal system 
affects firm value in CBAs. Therefore, in alternative estimations of equation (3), we employ the 
following proxies: (a) a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 when the target firm operates in a 
country under Common Law (=Common Law), and 0 otherwise, (b) the time-varying ‘Legal 
Enforcement of Contracts’ measure obtained from the Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom), and (c) the 
time-varying ‘Regulatory Quality’ and ‘Rule of Law’ measures obtained from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). We also employ the time-varying 
‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’, ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Control of Corruption’ 
variables to account for the impact of institutional changes over time on firm value. 
Extant literature (e.g., Fuller et al., 2002) shows that acquirer value is positively related to the 
relative size of the deal (measured as the ratio of the deal value to the market value of the acquirer 20 
trading days prior to the M&A announcement). Therefore, the relative size of the deal (=Relative Size) 
is included in equation (3). Further, information asymmetry between merging firms can influence firm 
value. Zhang (2006) suggest that investors tend to have more information on firms with a longer trading 
history, which results in lower information asymmetry. Therefore, the age of the acquirer (measured by 
the log of the number of days between the announcement day and the first record of the company in 
Datastream) (=Acquirer Age) is included in equation (3). 
Key financial ratios of the acquiring firm, such as its market-to-book value (=Acquirer MTBV), its 
cash and equivalent relative to its total assets (=Acquirer Cash Ratio), its debt to equity ratio (=Acquirer 
13 
 
Debt/Equity), and the ratio of net profit over revenue (=Acquirer Net Margin) that record information 
about the acquirer’s growth opportunities and profitability are also added in equation (3). 
Bradley et al. (1988), Campa & Kedia (2002) and Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam (2012) point to the 
impact of industrial diversification on firm value. Therefore, to control for the potential effect of 
industrial diversification, a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for cross-industry deals (i.e., where 
the target and acquirer do not share the same primary two-digit SIC code) (=Diversifying M&A), and 0 
otherwise (=Focused M&A), is included in equation (3). 
The merger-valuation risk and post-acquisition integration cost for the acquirer increases with the 
level of intangible assets of the target. To account for such challenges, in equation (3) we include the 
‘Target in Intangible Sector’ dummy, assigned the value of 1 if the target is operating within Media, 
Retail, High Technology, Healthcare, or Telecommunication sectors, and 0 otherwise, as in Barbopoulos 
et al. (2017). 
Baker et al. (2009) argue that CBAs in countries with higher capital controls are likely to achieve 
higher corporate wealth creation. The level of capital control of targets’ domiciles is measured by the 
capital control index developed by Gwartney et al. (2014) and updated annually. The Capital Control 
variable (=Target Capital Control) is included in equation (3). 
Kiymaz (2004) suggests that the impact on firm value of CBAs is affected by the strength of their 
domestic currency relative to the currency of the target firm’s country. To measure the wealth effects of 
exchange rate fluctuations, we use the procedure outlined by Kiymaz (2004) to create an index. A 
positive (negative) value of the index indicates that the acquiring firm’s currency has appreciated 
(depreciated) relative to the target’s native currency. Acquisitions made when the domestic currency 
was stronger are expected to generate higher firm value. Therefore, the exchange rate (=Exchange Rate) 
is included in equation (3). 
Doukas & Travlos (1988) and Doukas (1995) suggest that firm value from CBAs is greater when 
expanding into emerging countries. Therefore, we use country classification as offered by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the World Bank and construct within equation (3) a dummy variable assigned the value of 
1 if the target firm is based in an emerging country (=Target in Emerging Country), and 0 otherwise 
(=Target in Developed Country). 
Lastly, Manzon et al. (1994) test whether differences in firm-level and target-country tax systems 
affect the acquirer value in CBAs. To account for divergent tax policies across countries, we use data 
on corporate tax rates offered by the IMF, OECD, and the World Bank (=Target Corporate Tax) in 
equation (3). Finally, we add in equation (3) acquirer country, target industry, and year fixed effects. 
 
Self-Selection 
As stated in the Introduction section, we address self-selection bias concerns regarding the endogeneity 
of a firm’s decision to engage in a CBA (or not) (as in Campa & Kedia, 2002) and the firm’s decision 
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to employ earnout in the financing process of the deal (or not) (as in Barbopoulos et al., 2017) using (a) 
the Heckman two-stage procedure, and (b) the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method augmented 
with the Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity method. We acknowledge that the issue of addressing such self-
selection bias issues is more complex in the earnout-financed CBAs context, and perhaps even more so 
in the context of earnout-financed FTCBAs, as we are dealing with (a) the firm’s primary decision to 
globally diversify and (b) the firm’s subsequent decision to employ earnout financing in its payment 
process of the deal. 
 
DATA AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Data 
The sample consists of M&As announced by UK, US, Canadian and Australian acquirers between 
01/01/1992 and 31/12/2012 and recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC). Figure 1 provides 
the absolute and relative frequency of earnout financing activity by acquiring-firm country. Consistent 
with Kohers & Ang (2000) and Datar et al. (2001), earnout financing is regularly used in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Clearly, the largest volume of earnout-financed M&As are announced by British, American, 
Canadian and Australian acquirers. While the relative frequency of earnout financing is relatively high 
in the right-hand half of Figure 1, the absolute earnout activity is in many countries very low, making 
meaningful statistical analysis impossible. As a result, we retain only M&As announced by acquirers 
based in the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
We apply standard sample selection restrictions. Specifically, we restrict our sample to deals 
exceeding $1m and to acquirers with market value over $1m (4 weeks prior to the announcement of the 
deal). As we wish to study M&As motivated by changes in corporate control, we follow Rossi & Volpin 
(2004) and focus on deals in which the acquirer aims to purchase at least 50% of the target firm’s equity. 
Targets of public, private and subsidiary listing statuses and all domiciles (domestic or foreign) are 
included in the sample. To avoid the confounding effects of multiple acquisitions, deals announced 
within five days of another deal by the same acquirer are excluded from the sample. Also excluded are 
buy-backs, repurchases, exchange offers, recapitalisations, privatisations, self-tender offers, spin-offs, 
reverse M&As, and M&As where either the acquirer or the target firm are ‘government and agencies’ 
organisations. The daily stock price and market value of the acquirer needs to be available from 
Datastream. The above criteria are satisfied by 7,701 UK, 18,080 US, 3,702 Canadian and 2,365 
Australian M&As, leaving us with a final sample of 31,848 M&A announcements. 7,605 of these are 
CBAs, involving targets in 141 countries (details on these countries are available upon request). 
Table 1 records the annual distribution of our sample deals by M&A type and payment method. 
This shows that while earnout is used in 13% of all deals, it is used in 25% of M&As announced by UK 
firms (consistent with Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam, 2012), and only 9%, 7% and 10%, respectively, of 
M&As announced by American, Canadian and Australian firms, respectively. The UK is the most active 
15 
 
earnout market worldwide.11 The table also shows that CBAs account for 23.9% of our sample, but the 
prevalence of CBA varies substantially amongst the four countries, with 43% of Canadian but only 
15.6% of US acquisitions crossing their national borders. FTCBAs account for 6.6% of the overall 
sample, with NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME accounting for 7.6% and 9.7% of the sample, 
respectively. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Finally, Table 1 highlights the two major merger waves across our sample period. Interestingly, 
while the merger waves are observed for total M&A activity, and for domestic M&As and CBAs 
separately, the patterns are not so clear for FTCBAs. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 2 records the descriptive statistics of our sample by acquirer country. Consistent with Faccio & 
Masulis (2005) and Draper & Paudyal (2006), Table 2 shows that the majority of M&As in all four 
countries involve unlisted target firms (81% of all domestic deals and 85% of all CBAs). Approximately 
42% of deals are industry diversifying and 64% involve targets from intangible-rich sectors. Table 2 
also conveys that 90% of all target firms operate within countries under the Common Law legal system. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The average deal size is larger in the US than in the other three countries. In the UK and Australia, 
CBAs tend to be much larger than domestic M&As. CBAs also involve larger acquirers, on average, 
relative to domestic M&As. Nevertheless, not all CBAs appear to share the above characteristics, as 
FTCBAs are substantially smaller in size and younger than the established MNCs. However, deals 
announced by FTCBAs exhibit the greatest relative deal size, on average, compared to domestic and 
established MNCs. This further corroborates the increased risk faced by acquirers in their initial 
(=FTCBA), relative to their subsequent (=NFTCBA) CBAs, as well as relative to domestic M&As. In 
addition, FTCBAs exhibit the greatest cash ratio and (with the exception of US firms) the lowest debt-
to-equity ratio, relative to those announced by domestic and existing MNCs. Moreover, while the 
relative earnout value (=ratio of earnout value to deal value) offers an accurate proxy for the riskiness 
of an earnout-financed deal (consistent with Cain et al., 2011), the fact that higher earnout value is 
observed for FTCBAs relative to counterparts announced by other MNCs provides another indication 
of the high valuation risk faced by acquirers in FTCBAs. Lastly, we find that in FTCBAs younger 
acquirers tend to use earnout, and that earnout-financed FTCBAs have low net margins. 
Table 3 records the correlations between the variables in our analysis. Noticeable correlations, as 
expected, are recorded between CBAs and Geographical Distance (=80%) and Target Country 
Regulatory Quality and Target in Emerging Markets (= – 82%). The correlation coefficients in general 
do not raise any concerns regarding multicollinearity that may make it difficult to assess the effect of 
independent variables in multiple regressions. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Extent of the Acquiring Firm’s Global Diversification and Earnout Financing 
In the univariate analysis, we examine whether firm value, as proxied by the acquirer abnormal returns, 
depends on (a) the choice of acquirers without any prior international business experience to set up 
transnational operations (i.e., FTCBA), as opposed to acquirers with prior international business 
experience that continue to diversify globally (i.e., NFTCBA), and (b) the choice of earnout in the 
financing process of the deal (hypotheses 1a and 1b). The results, reported in Table 4, are consistent 
with a generally positive valuation effect of global diversification (consistent with Gande et al., 2009), 
which is particularly powerful in FTCBAs financed with deferred payments in the form of earnouts.12 
Panel A shows that FTCBAs announced by British acquirers yield higher average acquirer abnormal 
returns, at 2.53 percentage points, compared to the corresponding 1.59, 0.78 and 0.67 percentage points 
for domestic M&As, NFTCBA_NEW, and NFTCBA_SAME, respectively. The differences of 0.95, 
1.75 and 1.87, respectively, are significant at the 5% and 1% levels (differentials are not reported for 
brevity, but are available upon request). 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
We confirm the same patterns for deals announced by American, Canadian and Australian 
acquirers (Panels B to D, respectively). That is, FTCBAs generally create more value than domestic 
M&As and the M&As announced by established MNCs (NFTCBA_NEW or NFTCBA_SAME), yet 
this is most notable when earnouts are involved. This suggests that the benefits of global diversification 
depend on both (a) the acquiring firm’s degree of existing global diversification, and (b) the choice of 
deferred financing in the form of earnout.13 Collectively, these results support our Hypotheses 1a and 
1b. 
Our results across all four acquiring countries further show that domestic target acquirers 
outperform their NFTCBA_SAME counterparts. Moreover, in unreported results we find some 
indication of higher abnormal returns in FTCBAs in Asia and the Rest of the World group of countries, 
although British acquirers generally perform better when acquiring European targets (results available 
upon request). 
Overall, these results support our predictions that earnouts in NFTCBA_NEW or 
NFTCBA_SAME are not expected to significantly benefit acquirers, unlike in those deals announced 
by FTCBAs. When firms have experience in identifying, evaluating, negotiating with and integrating 
targets across their national borders and the acquisition has limited impact on the acquiring firm’s level 
of global diversification, earnout seems to offer no tangible benefits to the acquirer. This is even more 
evident in the case of deals announced by NFTCBA_SAME, given that the acquirer has prior local 
market knowledge in the target firm’s domicile. 
The results discussed above are obtained from the univariate analysis; hence, they do not 
simultaneously account for the effect of deal, firm and country specific factors, along with the joint 
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impact of global diversification and earnout financing, on firm value. To accommodate the impact of 
such factors, we conduct a multivariate analysis of a cross-sectional sample of firms via OLS nested 
regressions. However, a concern in interpreting our results from such a multivariate analysis, as well as 
the univariate results discussed above, is whether they are affected by self-selection bias with regards to 
endogeneity of the firms’ choice whether to diversify globally (or not) and to choose to employ earnout 
(or not) in the financing process of the deal. We address such issues following the Heckman two-stage 
procedure and the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method augmented with the Rosenbaum-bounds 
(RB) sensitivity method. 
 
Heckman two-stage procedure. We are dealing with concerns related to two potentially endogenous 
firm choices: the basic choice of the firm to diversify internationally or not (i.e., CBA, FTCBA, 
NFTCBA_NEW, NFTCBA_SAME) and also, if the firm chooses to diversify internationally, the choice 
to employ earnouts in the financing process or not. To accommodate such concerns in our multivariate 
analysis, we include the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) in each of our regressions. The IMRs are associated 
with the selection equations that correspond to the firm’s choice to (a) globally diversify (CBA) or to be 
engaged in a FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW, or NFTCBA_SAME, and (b) use earnout financing. We use a 
bivariate probit model with sample selection to control for self-selection for the decision of CBA, 
FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW, NFTCBA_SAME, and for earnout financing. For brevity, we do not report 
the first stage (selection equation). The results from the multivariate analysis, which include the 
lambdas, are reported in Table 5.14 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
Specifically, in the second stage of Model 1 we include the λCBA, which accounts for the firm’s 
choice to engage in a CBA (basic choice to diversify globally). In the second stage of Models 2 (full 
sample), 6 and 9 to 12 (only CBA sample), we include the λFTCBA, which accounts for the firm’s choice 
to engage in a CBA for the first time (i.e., FTCBA). In the second stage of Models 3 and 7 (only CBA 
sample) we include the λNFTCBA_NEW, which accounts for the firm’s choice to engage in a NFTCBA in a 
new country while it already has acquired a target before in another foreign country (i.e., 
NFTCBA_NEW). In the second stage of Models 4 and 8 (only CBA sample) we include the 
λNFTCBA_SAME, which accounts for the firm’s choice to engage in a NFTCBA in the same country that the 
firm had previously acquired a target (i.e., NFTCBA_SAME). Finally, in the second stage across all 
Models (Models 1 to 4 for the full sample; Models 5 to 12 for only the CBA sample; Model 13 for only 
the FTCBA sample) we include the λEARNOUT, which accounts for the firm’s choice to employ earnout. 
As can be seen from Table 5, lambdas are insignificant (except when the control group contains domestic 
M&As where coefficients are statistically significant but small), and hence self-selection does not have 
a significant impact on the interpretation of our results. 
Estimates across all models indicate that deals involving unlisted targets, and relatively large deals, 
add more value to acquirers, in line with Fuller et al. (2002). We find the acquirer market-to-book ratio, 
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acquirer age, and deals involving targets operating in intangible-rich sectors to be inversely related to 
firm value in domestic M&As but not in CBAs (Models 5 to 12) and FTCBAs (Model 13). Acquirer 
cash ratio is found to be positively related to firm value. Acquirer Debt-to-Equity is found to positively 
affect firm value only in FTCBAs. Results also show that industry-diversifying deals destroy value, 
again only in FTCBAs. CBAs in emerging markets add more value to acquirers while both capital 
controls and geographical distance inversely affect acquirer value. We also find that FTCBAs from the 
UK, Canada and Australia acquiring targets in the US with earnout enhance firm value in general. In 
additional tests (available upon request), we find that cross-border LBO transactions have a positive 
impact on firm value, consistent with Cao et al. (2015), and that withdrawn deals have no differential 
impact on firm value.15 
Models 1 and 2 investigate the impact of (a) earnout-financed CBAs, and (b) earnout-financed 
FTCBAs, relative to all domestic and remaining CBAs, respectively, on firm value. Results from Model 
1 show that earnout-financed CBAs yield inferior value to acquirers, consistent with findings of 
Mantecon (2009). Nevertheless, Model 2 reveals the positive and significant benefits of global 
diversification in CBAs announced by FTCBAs. FTCBAs add significant value to acquirers when 
earnouts are used (coefficient ‘EARNOUT × FTCBA’ = 0.014, significant at the 5% level). Specifically, 
earnout-financed FTCBAs add 1.4% higher value to the acquiring firm, relative to other M&As, namely 
to both domestic and remaining CBAs. Models 3 and 4, unlike Model 2, confirm that the benefits of 
global diversification in the presence of earnout financing are limited to FTCBAs (as both interactions 
of ‘EARNOUT × FTCBA_NEW’ and ‘EARNOUT × FTCBA_SAME’ are statistically insignificant). 
This offers further support to our Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
In Models 5 to 12, we turn our attention to factors that are likely to influence the value of firms 
engaged in CBAs and consider the effects of cultural and geographical distance between the merging 
firms’ countries, and the strength of the legal system and law enforcement of contracts. Moreover, across 
all models we control for the effects of the level of capital controls, the strength of the acquiring firm’s 
home currency relative to the currency of the host country, whether the target operates in an emerging 
market or not, the level of corporate tax, and common language. Model 6 reveals that earnout-financed 
FTCBAs yield 1.7% higher value to the acquiring firm (coefficient ‘EARNOUT × FTCBA’ = 0.017, 
significant at the 5% level), relative to M&As announced by established MNCs. Models 7 and 8 further 
confirm the latter. This reinforces our earlier predictions that the impact of earnout in eliminating 
merger-valuation risk in NFTCBA_NEW or NFTCBA_SAME, relative to FTCBA, is expected to be of 
a lower magnitude. Lastly, Model 13 aims to identify the factors that influence the acquirer value from 
engaging in only FTCBAs. As an uncertainty-resolution payment mechanism, the choice of earnout 
financing in FTCBAs leads to an immediate 1.3% significantly higher firm value (‘Earnout’ coefficient 
= 0.013, significant at the 1% level). Collectively, the results presented above strongly support the view 
that FTCBAs, rather than NFTCBAs, benefit significantly from earnout financing. These findings 
support both Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
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Target-Firm and Target-Country-Specific Effects 
We next investigate whether the target firm’s listing status, the target country’s strength of legal system, 
and the cultural and geographical distance between the merging firms’ countries interact with the 
acquiring firm’s global diversification and earnout financing in influencing firm value in CBAs. Model 
9 conveys that earnout-financed FTCBAs that involve unlisted firms add 1.4% higher value to the 
acquiring firm (coefficient ‘Earnout × FTCBA × UNL_TRG’ = 0.014, significant at the 5% level), 
relative to remaining CBAs. This supports our Hypothesis 2: earnout financing in FTCBAs offers a 
mechanism for the resolution of uncertainty originating from the information asymmetry between the 
merging firms. Models 10 and 11 investigate whether firm value in FTCBAs is affected by likely 
merger-valuation challenges, as proxied by the cultural and geographical distance between the merging 
firms’ countries; the same models investigate how earnout financing can potentially mitigate, if not 
solve, such risks. Both models show that the benefits of earnout financing are higher in FTCBAs 
(coefficient ‘Earnout × FTCBA × CD’ = 0.004 and ‘Earnout × TFCBA × GD’ = 0.002, both significant 
at the 5% level), offering support to Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Once again, earnout financing seems to 
contribute to address merger-valuation risk which is particularly noticeable in FTCBAs in target 
countries that are culturally different to, and geographically distant from, the acquirer country. 
Moreover, FTCBAs are likely to create more value for the acquirer when the legal enforcement of 
contracts in the host country is strong and hence, the earnout financing benefits are more likely to be 
delivered. Lastly, Model 12 offers strong evidence that earnout-financed FTCBAs enhance firm value 
more when the regulatory quality in the host country is particularly high.16 These results are consistent 
with our Hypothesis 4. 
 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) methods. To deal with self-selection 
concerns in the univariate analysis, we employ the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method.17 The 
PSM allows for a bias-reduced causal inference by pairing treated deals (i.e., earnout) with untreated or 
control (i.e., non-earnout) deals, based on a propensity score that is estimated at deal level via a logit 
model using observable features, such as those discussed in the section on variables. For brevity we do 
not report these results, but they are available upon request. Following the matching exercise, the proxy 
of firm value of treated and control sample deals are compared. The propensity scores of the acquirer 
choice of earnout and non-earnout within FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME are 
estimated. Specifically, the PSM is employed in three Exercises: in Exercise 1, earnout-financed deals 
announced by FTCBAs are matched to non-earnout financed deals announced by FTCBA; in Exercise 
2, earnout deals announced by NFTCBA_NEW are matched to non-earnout deals announced by 
NFTCBA_NEW; and in Exercise 3, earnout deals announced by NFTCBA_SAME are matched to non-
earnout deals announced by NFTCBA_SAME. Each exercise allows us to disentangle the impact of 
earnout vs. non-earnout from the impact of the deal type per se. Through this quasi-experimental 
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research design based on the PSM, the earnout effect is therefore evaluated in isolation. 
Across each exercise, we select deals from the non-earnout group based on alternative Matching 
Ratios (MR) of 1:1, 3:1 and 5:1 within 1% Absolute Probability Difference (APD). To check for the 
accuracy of the matching, we test whether the distributions of the covariates between the treated and 
control groups are similar using the two-sample t-test. The test results (available upon request) confirm 
that the distributions of the logistic model covariates for all subgroups of CBAs between treated and 
control groups, while statistically different before the matching, are not statistically different after the 
matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). We apply the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) sensitivity method 
(Rosenbaum, 2002) to assess the effect of possible omitted variable bias that may affect the propensity 
score estimation and thus our findings. This method allows us to investigate the exposure of our derived 
conclusions from the PSM to the effect of missing covariates from our propensity score estimator (logit 
model). RB results are also available upon request. 
 
Determinants of Earnout Choice. The PSM method is based on matching treated to control sample 
deals based on a propensity score predicting the use of the earnout. Therefore, the logistic regression is 
implemented to model the choice of earnouts in deals announced by FTCBAs (Exercise 1), 
NFTCBA_NEW (Exercise 2), or NFTCBA_SAME (Exercise 3), and calculate each deal’s propensity 
to exhibit the treatment or earnout. In the estimations, our dependent variable is a dummy variable that 
assumes the value of 1 if a deal is earnout-financed, and 0 otherwise. 
Extant earnout literature illustrates that earnouts are most likely to be used in acquisitions of 
unlisted target firms, operating in intangible-rich sectors or unrelated industries and being subject to 
substantial risk that is mainly traced through adverse selection and moral hazard channels (Kohers and 
Ang, 2000). Moreover, Datar et al. (2001) illustrate that Common Law countries facilitate powerful 
contractual agreements, thus increasing the likelihood of the use of earnout. In addition, we employ the 
market-to-book ratio to capture the acquirer’s growth opportunities and hence examine the extent to 
which acquirers are already exposed to, or are perhaps seeking to externally acquire, growth 
opportunities. In the latter case, the earnout offers a relatively safe solution as it incentivises the retention 
of performance milestones required for payment (Cadman et al., 2014). Moreover, as earnout is more 
likely to be used in riskier unlisted target deals, we use relative deal size to offer a proxy for the deal’s 
riskiness (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 2011). Kohers and Ang (2000: 459) argue that “Since the 
costs of valuation mistakes are increasing with the target’s relative size, risk-averse bidders are more 
likely to seek protection from this misvaluation risk through the use of larger proportions of earnouts.”. 
We also utilise key financial ratios of the acquiring firm as further determinants of the earnout use. 
These consist of the acquiring firm’s cash-ratio (total cash and cash equivalents to total assets), its debt-
to-equity ratio (total debt to common equity) and net profit to revenue (profit margin). These variables 
proxy for the liquidity, leverage and profitability profile of the acquiring firm. Lastly, we include factors 
known to influence CBA activity. These consist of the target country’s level of economic development, 
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the capital controls in place in the target country, the corporate tax rate that is in effect in the target 
country and the relative strength of the acquiring firm’s currency. 
When matching within NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME deals, we also include the ratio of 
the acquiring firm’s foreign to total sales, as these acquirers have sale revenues from previous foreign 
operations.18 This allows us to further capture how the acquiring firm’s degree of global diversification 
affects the valuation effects of earnout, as well as match treated earnout deals to non-earnout 
counterfactual M&As involving acquirers that are exposed to similar degrees of global diversification 
(Reuer et al., 2004). 
 
PSM and RB Methods within FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME: The earnout effect. 
Table 6, Panel A, presents the output of the PSM within deals announced by FTCBAs. The results across 
all panels invariably show that irrespective of the MR that we use (1:1, 1:3, or 1:5), earnout-financed 
FTCBAs (=Treated) enhance firm value more than counterparts financed by non-earnout (=Control). 
Specifically, earnout-financed FTCBAs announced by British acquirers yield higher average acquirer 
abnormal returns, at 2.59 percentage points, compared to the corresponding of 0.09 percentage points 
of counterparts’ non-earnout-financed FTCBAs (MR = 1:1). The difference of 2.50 percentage points is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that earnout-financed FTCBAs on average add 2.50% higher 
value to the acquiring firm, relative to control deals. We find the same results for FTCBAs announced 
by American, Canadian and Australian firms, regardless of the MR employed. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
We further show that earnout-financed deals announced by NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME 
(Panels B and C, respectively) are less beneficial to acquirers, as differentials between the treated and 
control groups of deals across all four acquiring countries are statistically insignificant. Lastly, the 
results across all Panels and MRs are relatively insensitive to the impact of any missing or unobserved 
covariate, as indicated through the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) sensitivity analysis (these results are for 
brevity not reported, but are available upon request). 19  These results offer further support to our 
hypotheses 1a and 1b predicting the value enhancing impact of earnout in FTCBAs rather in the 
remaining CBAs (i.e., NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presents new insights into the impact of earnout financing on firm value when engaged in 
cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Our analysis is based on a sample of 31,848 domestic and foreign 
target acquisition announcements originating from the four countries with the highest volume of 
earnout-financed M&As: the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. Prior research suggests that acquirers 
at best break even when involved in earnout-financed CBAs. We show that earnout-financed first-time 
CBAs (i.e., FTCBAs) yield superior firm value, relative to all domestic deals or M&As by established 
MNCs regardless of whether the non-first-time cross-border acquirer is entering a new market (i.e., 
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NFTCBA_NEW) or not (i.e., NFTCBA_SAME). Therefore, in line with the predictions of our 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the results confirm the superior performance of FTCBAs, and establish that 
earnout financing generally enhances firm value when firms choose to expand internationally for the 
first time in their business history through a corporate takeover. 
This suggests that the contingent nature of earnout financing can help address (a) potential adverse 
section and moral hazard issues and, (b) the acquirers’ lack of prior international experience, hence 
allows them to efficiently accommodate the inherent risks of leaving their home country for the first 
time and expanding into a new geographical market through a CBA. To this end, the uncertainty-
resolution properties of earnout financing help maximise the likelihood of the deal’s success. We find 
the benefits to FTCBAs of using earnout financing are higher where the target firm is unlisted, where 
the cultural or geographical distance between the merging firms’ countries is large, and when acquiring 
in countries where the regulatory quality is strong. The results further suggest that the firm value from 
earnout-financed FTCBAs increase when expanding into emerging markets that exhibit a higher level 
of investment risk. 
To reduce the exposure of the derived conclusions to potential self-selection bias considerations, 
we adopt (a) the Heckman two-stage procedure and, (b) a quasi-experimental research design via the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method augmented with the Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity analysis 
through which the earnout effect is evaluated in isolation. The analysis based on the Heckman two-stage 
procedure renders our results qualitatively unaffected. Moreover, the PSM analysis offers direct 
evidence of the superiority of earnouts over non-earnouts (yielding on average more than 2 percentage-
points higher announcement-period abnormal returns) in FTCBAs. By contrast, the superior 
performance of earnouts when used to finance FTCBAs does not appear to hold for subsequent 
international acquisitions, whether into a new country (NFTCBA_NEW) or not (NFTCBA_SAME). 
Overall, this paper offers a thorough examination of the impact of earnout financing on the firm 
value when engaged in CBAs. When firms choose to acquire a target firm beyond their national borders 
through a CBA, earnout financing offers a major value enhancing opportunity. 
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Notes 
1 Earlier scholars show that the value of firms engaged in CBAs is sensitive to managerial motives 
(managers’ enhanced job security (Amihud & Lev, 1981)), agency costs (Seth et al., 2000), national 
pride of acquiring targets based in developed countries (Hope et al., 2011), market access (Doukas & 
Travlos, 1988), industry affiliation (Denis et al., 2002), quality of accounting standards (Bris & Cabolis, 
2008), intangibility of assets (Chari et al., 2010), shareholder protection (Rossi & Volpin, 2004), 
international taxation (Huizinga et al., 2012), global diversification (Gande et al., 2009), and other 
factors (Eckbo, 2009; Erel et al., 2012). 
2 Previous research shows that CBAs are associated with higher merger-valuation complexities and 
risks, as well as post-acquisition integration challenges, relative to domestic M&As (Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2005); hence CBAs lead to lower firm value than domestic M&As. A notable exception 
is Danbolt & Maciver (2012), who find cross-border bidders outperform domestic ones into and out of 
the UK. 
3 While single up-front payments in stock could address adverse selection and moral hazard issues 
(Hansen, 1987), foreign targets are rarely willing to accept foreign equity as the payment, which restricts 
acquirers to the cash-payment option (Moeller & Schligemann, 2005). Fishman (1989) also argues that, 
in cases of valuation disagreement, cash financing may offer a sub-optimal contract design. 
4 Such deals may include unfamiliar institutions and cultural values, disparate accounting practices, 
capital restrictions, tax policies and disclosure rules, divergent contract enforceability due to legal and 
regulatory differences, and unpredictable future cash flows at home due to unforeseen exchange rate 
movements. 
5 Moral hazard arises when contractual performance cannot be precisely monitored or enforced due to 
weak contract formulation, imprecise performance measurement, or weak contract-enforcement 
remedies available to the party exposed to performance failure by the other contracting parties. For a 
discussion of the adverse selection and moral hazard perspectives of earnouts, see Cain et al. (2011). 
6 While cash deals expose acquirers to the full risk of target overvaluation, in stock deals this risk is 
shared between the merging firms (Hansen, 1987). Stock deals, nevertheless, do not always guarantee 
that the target firm is managed to ensure the realisation of the expected value implied by the acquisition 
premium, unless the target owners/managers retain sufficient interest through their equity in the 
combined firm. 
7 Under equity financing, the target firm’s ownership in the combined firm is usually relatively small, 
and hence, the acquirer is disproportionately exposed to post-merger price corrections in case of 
misvaluation error (Kohers & Ang, 2000). 
8  Several other contractual mechanisms are available for enhancing M&A success such as (a) 
termination fees, lockups and material adverse-change clauses that are designed to prevent, or raise the 
cost of, either the acquirer or the target reneging on the deal, (b) collars that are designed to minimise 
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the impact of short term adverse stock price movements, and (c) toeholds that are designed to increase 
the probability of deal success through buying up chunks of target shares. Unlike earnouts that are 
designed to manage valuation risk, these mechanisms are designed to eliminate transactional risk. 
9 For robustness, we estimate abnormal returns using the market model (MM), the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) and the Fama-French 3-factor model (3-FFM) (with parameters estimated over days t-
250 to t-40). In unreported results (available upon request) we find that the correlations between the 
CAR obtained from (a) the market-adjusted model, (b) MM, (c) CAPM, and (d) 3-FFM, across all four 
countries, are in excess of 0.90. All results using CAR obtained from (a), (b), (c) and (d) are qualitatively 
similar, and our conclusions hold regardless of which event study model we apply. 
10 While Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (and Kogut & Singh’s measure) of CD have been subject to 
critique (see e.g., Shenkar, 2001; Kirkman et al., 2006, 2017; Caprar et al., 2015), it remains the most 
widely used proxy for CD in the international business literature (Beugelsdijk et al. 2017; Kirkman et 
al., 2017). 
11 CBAs initiated by UK acquirers accounted for almost 30% of global CBAs in the late 1980s (Healy 
& Palepu, 1993). UNCTAD (2000) confirms this for the late 1990s. Historically one in three, and 
recently almost one in two, UK acquirers have been involved in CBAs, making the UK the most CBA- 
active market worldwide. 
12 Our results are also consistent with findings from prior research on the impact of earnout on the 
acquiring firm’s value (Kohers & Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos & Sudarsanam, 2012). We find that earnout-
financed M&As enhance firm value more than their counterparts financed with single up-front 
payments in cash or stock. Consistent with Mantecon (2009), we also find that choosing earnouts rather 
than single up-front payments does not significantly enhance a foreign acquirer’s value relative to 
domestic ones. 
13 While we might have expected some, if modest, benefits of earnout in addressing valuation risk in 
NFTCBA_NEW (as opposed to NFTCBA_SAME, where the acquirer has prior local market 
knowledge), generally we do not find this to be the case. This may be due to the characteristics of 
NFTCBA_NEW, in which the acquirers are generally large (and perhaps the transactions are small 
relative to the acquirer’s size), suggesting the valuation risk is less of an issue in such deals. With deals 
announced by NFTCBA_SAME and NFTCBA_NEW offering no or only modest expansion of the 
firm’s global diversification, such deals have only limited impact on the acquiring firm’s value. 
14 The variables in the selection equations are (a) the relative size of the deal, (b) in the selection 
equation of CBA, FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME a dummy variable assigned the 
value of 1 if earnout is used (0 otherwise), (c) in the selection equation of earnout a dummy variable 
assigned the value of 1 if the deal is CBA (0 otherwise), (d) a dummy variable if the deal is diversifying 
(0 otherwise), (e) dummy variables assigned the value of 1 if the target firm is in an intangible-rich 
sector (0 otherwise), (f) a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 if the target is an unlisted firm (0 
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otherwise), (g) acquirer characteristics such as the MTBV, cash-ratio and debt-to-equity ratio, and (h) 
acquirer country, target industry, and year fixed effects. 
15 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to these tests. 
16 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we employ alternative measures of the quality of legal 
system, such as the classification to common vs. civil law (La Porta et al., 1997) and the legal 
enforcement of contracts (Fraser Institute). These results are available upon request. 
17  Behr and Heid (2011) provide a thorough discussion of the PSM methodology along with its 
application in evaluating the success of German bank mergers in the period 1995-2000. See also Dehejia 
& Wahba (2002) for an application of the matching method. 
18 Denis et al. (2002) argue that the observed increase in the prevalence of global diversification over 
time stems from both an increase in the fraction of firms operating in multiple national markets and, 
conditional on the existence of global diversification, the fraction of total firm sales that are attributable 
to foreign operations. 
19 The RB critical value of Γ at p=0.10 (=41% for the UK, 30% for the US, 72% for Canada and 22% 
for Australia) offers relatively high confidence regarding the quality and reliability of our PSM process. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
This table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis and indicates the data source used. SDC 
denotes the Thomson-Reuters SDC ONE Banker database. 
Variable Type/Name Description Source 
All Refers to the entire sample analysed in this paper. SDC 
Acquirer Age 
Number of days between the acquirer’s first 
recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s 
announcement day. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Cash Ratio 
Acquirer’s ratio of total cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets in the quarter prior to 
the announcement of the deal. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Debt / Equity 
Acquirer’s total debt as a percentage of common 
equity value during the quarter prior to the 
announcement of the deal. 
Datastream 
Acquirer MTBV 
Acquirer’s ratio of market value over book 
value of equity (measured 20 days prior to the 
deal’s announcement). 
Datastream 
Acquirer MV Acquirer’s market value of equity (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement). Datastream 
Acquirer Net Margin 
Acquirer’s ratio of net profit to revenue during 
the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement. 
Datastream 
Cash Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% cash. SDC 
Common Language Dummy = 1 if acquirer and target countries share a common language. World Bank 
Cross-Border Acquisition 
(CBA) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal involves a foreign 
target, and = 0 when acquirer and target are 
domiciled in the same country (= Domestic). 
SDC 
Cultural Distance (CD) 
Cultural distance between acquirer and target 
countries in terms of Hofstede’s power distance, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism (see Eq. 4). 
Kogut & Singh 
(1988) 
Diversifying M&A 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target do not 
share the same two-digit primary SIC code, and 
= 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Deal Value Deal transaction value, in millions of US dollars. SDC 
Domestic (Dom) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target are 
domiciled in the same country, and = 0 when the 
deal involves a foreign target (= CBA). 
SDC 
Earnout (Earn) Dummy = 1 when payment includes an earnout provision, and = 0 otherwise (=Non-Earnout). SDC 
Earnout Value Value of deferred payment, in millions of US dollars. SDC 
Exchange Rate  Strength of acquirer to target country currency, following Kiymaz (2004). Datastream 
Foreign to Total  
Acquirer’s foreign sales as a percentage of total 
sales during the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement. 
Datastream 
First Time CBA 
(FTCBA) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal constitutes an 
acquiring firm’s first cross-border deal ever, and 
= 0 otherwise.  
SDC 
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Continued 
Continued (Appendix) 
Variable Type/Name Description Source 
Geographical Distance 
(GD) 
Distance (in kilometres) between acquirer and 
target countries. distancefromto.net 
Mixed 
Dummy = 1 when the payment is a mixture of 
cash, stock and/or other methods of payment, 
excluding earnout provisions, and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Non-Earnout 
Dummy = 1 for full cash, full stock or mixed 
payment without earnout provisions, and = 0 
when an earnout provision is included. 
SDC 
Relative Size Ratio of Deal Value to MV. SDC & Datastream 
Relative earnout value  Ratio of earnout value to Deal Value. SDC 
Stock Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% stock exchange. SDC 
Unlisted Target 
(UNL_TRG) 
Dummy = 1 if target is not a listed firm, and = 0 
otherwise. SDC 
Not First-Time CBA New 
Country 
(NFTCBA_NEW) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is not the acquirer’s 
first ever cross-border deal but takes place in an 
unprecedented country, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Not First Time CBA 
Same Country 
(NFTCBA_SAME) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is cross-border and 
takes place in a country in which the acquirer 
has already engaged in an M&A deal in the past. 
SDC 
Target Capital Control 
Time-varying index covering 141 countries. Its 
values range from 1.4 (for the least open 
economy) to 9.8 (for the most open economy). 
Economic 
Freedom of the 
World (2014) 
Target Common Law 
Dummy variable taking the value = 1 when the 
deal is cross-border and the target's nation 
follows the English Common Law legal system, 
and = 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1997) 
Target Corporate Tax Time-varying percentage of taxation on corporate profits across target countries.  
IMF, OECD, 
World Bank 
Target Country 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of 
ability of government to formulate and 
implement policies and regulations 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Target Country Rule of 
Law 
Rule of law captures extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Target Country Legal 
Enforcement of Contracts 
The legal enforcement of contracts in the 
target’s country.  Fraser Institute 
Target in Emerging 
Country 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is cross-border and 
the target is in an emerging market, and = 0 
otherwise.  
IMF, OECD, 
World Bank 
Target in Intangible 
Sector 
Dummy = 1 when the target belongs to an 
intangible-rich sector (Media and 
Entertainment, Consumer Products and 
Services, High Technology and 
Telecommunications), and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
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Table 1 Sample distribution by year 
Year 
All M&A 
(ALL) 
Domestic M&A 
(DOM) 
Cross-border 
M&A 
(CBA) 
First time CBA 
(FTCBA) 
Non-FTA CBA 
in a new market 
(NFTCBA 
NEW) 
Non-FTA CBA 
in the same 
market 
(NFTCBA 
SAME) 
Earnout 
payment 
 Cash 
(CASH) 
Stock 
(STOCK) 
Mixed 
(MIXED) 
1992 737 602 135 57 39 39 76 238 171 252 
1993 993 840 153 47 54 52 100 333 221 339 
1994 1,291 1,081 210 80 58 72 108 468 280 435 
1995 1,444 1,174 270 74 88 108 151 483 342 468 
1996 1,713 1,414 299 93 98 108 165 554 460 534 
1997 2,045 1,673 372 126 116 130 190 640 468 747 
1998 2,159 1,694 465 114 190 161 211 794 435 719 
1999 2,016 1,614 402 95 145 162 183 704 527 602 
2000 2,187 1,692 495 141 133 221 255 634 646 652 
2001 1,487 1,111 376 105 112 159 232 478 337 440 
2002 1,317 1,016 301 73 95 133 188 574 193 362 
2003 1,154 895 259 82 63 114 170 494 177 313 
2004 1,526 1,147 379 121 117 141 231 602 221 472 
2005 1,755 1,307 448 118 138 192 278 763 214 500 
2006 1812 1,313 499 157 154 188 292 801 203 516 
2007 2,034 1,447 587 155 186 246 331 830 248 625 
2008 1,354 935 419 111 124 184 222 562 185 385 
2009 1,012 705 307 79 78 150 125 387 217 283 
2010 1,313 880 433 106 135 192 202 562 166 383 
2011 1,300 879 421 107 141 173 233 544 156 367 
2012 1,199 824 375 72 147 156 182 568 154 295 
Total 31,848 24,243 7,605 2,113 2,411 3,081 4,125 12,013 6,021 9,689 
% of All - 76.1% 23.9% 6.6% 7.6% 9.7% 13.0% 37.7% 18.9% 30.4% 
UK 7,701 5,072 2629 448 887 1294 1931 3331 565 1874 
% of UK - 65.9% 34.1% 5.8% 11.5% 16.8% 25.1% 43.3% 7.3% 24.3% 
US 18,080 15,263 2817 981 1055 781 1694 7052 3895 5439 
% of US - 84.4% 15.6% 5.4% 5.8% 4.3% 9.4% 39.0% 21.5% 30.1% 
Canada 3,702 2,111 1591 473 320 798 258 949 952 1543 
% of Canada - 57.0% 43.0% 12.8% 8.6% 21.6% 7.0% 25.6% 25.7% 41.7% 
Australia 2,365 1,797 568 211 149 208 242 681 609 833 
% of Austral. - 76.0% 24.0% 8.9% 6.3% 8.8% 10.2% 28.8% 25.8% 35.2% 
Notes: This table reports the annual distribution of our sampled M&As announced by UK, US, Canadian and Australian acquirers. The overall sample (ALL) is split into 
domestic (DOM) and cross-border acquisitions (CBA), with the sample of CBA further divided into three groups: First-time CBA (FTCBA), Not-First-Time CBA in a New 
Country (NFTCBA_NEW), and Not-First-Time CBA in the Same Country (NFTCBA_SAME). The sample (ALL) is also split by method of payment, differentiating between 
acquisitions where an earnout payment is used, with the non-earnout (single up-front financed) deals split into where the payment was made using all cash (CASH), all stock 
(STOCK) or where a mixture of cash and stock payments were used (MIXED). Further details on the variables and data sources are in the Appendix.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 All Domestic CBA CBA Only  FTCBA NFTCBA New NFTCBA Same 
 All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. 
 Panel A: Acquirer in United Kingdom 
All Deals 7,701 1,931 5,072 1,302 2,629 629 448 112 887 221 1,294 296 
Unlisted Target 6,877 1,921 4,546 1,297 2,331 624 412 112 796 218 1,123 294 
Diversifying M&A 3,593 917 2,401 627 1,192 290 204 50 388 98 600 142 
Target in Intang. Sect. 4,683 1,412 3,187 956 1,496 456 288 92 476 162 732 202 
Target Common Law 6,574 1,672 5,072 1,302 1,502 370 260 59 332 87 910 224 
Deal Value ($m) 155.9 28.4 89.7 19.8 283.5 46.11 57.9 17.6 533.3 40.7 190.4 61.0 
Acquirer MV ($m) 2,002.8 807.1 976.3 397.9 3,983.3 1,654.1 446.6 219.6 4,515.6 2,085.0 4,842.8 1,875.2 
Relative Size 0.33 0.26 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.95 0.37 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.14 
MTBV 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.21 3.4 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.1 4.1 
Acquirer Age (years) 15.6 12.8 14.2 11.3 18.2 15.9 8.8 7.0 17.8 13.7 21.8 20.8 
Acquirer Net Margin 11.2 7.9 11.3 6.9 11.0 9.96 9.5 7.3 13.0 14.8 10.0 7.5 
Acquirer Cash Ratio 24.7 25.9 22.7 25.7 28.4 26.38 36.0 31.3 27.1 26.9 26.8 24.2 
Acquirer Debt/Equity 91.2 66.5 88.9 66.2 95.6 67.13 65.5 31.9 103.5 67.1 100.6 80.6 
Earnout Value ($m) 8.6 8.6 5.8 5.8 14.5 14.5 8.9 8.9 13.5 13.5 17.4 17.4 
Rel. Earnout Value 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 
 Panel B: Acquirer in United States 
All Deals 18,080 1,694 15,263 1,408 2,817 286 981 107 1,055 125 781 54 
Unlisted Target 14,597 1,662 12,311 1,379 2,286 283 848 104 870 125 568 54 
Diversifying M&A 7,603 682 6,454 583 1,149 99 421 40 410 43 318 16 
Target in Intang. Sect. 13,383 1,367 11,475 1,134 1,908 233 710 91 705 95 493 47 
Target Common Law 16,848 1,579 15,263 1,408 1,585 171 615 68 484 62 486 41 
Deal Value ($m) 337.3 98.9 358.1 85.98 225.0 162.46 95.9 42.0 246.5 250.4 358.1 197.5 
Acquirer MV ($m) 5,931.6 3,144.4 5,315.6 2,921.41 9,269.2 4,242.35 1,114.2 633.9 9,259.1 3,792.3 19,526.2 12,434.2 
Relative Size 0.45 0.23 0.44 0.24 0.48 0.20 0.78 0.28 0.32 0.16 0.31 0.14 
MTBV 9.7 2.0 9.8 2.05 9.4 2.03 5.6 3.2 3.4 2.5 2.8 4.3 
Acquirer Age (years) 10.9 10.3 10.5 10.2 12.9 11.1 7.3 6.1 14.6 13.7 17.7 15.2 
Acquirer Net Margin 96.8 8.7 113.1 8.67 12.9 8.65 9.0 8.4 17.9 8.6 10.1 9.3 
Acquirer Cash Ratio 34.6 38.0 34.4 37.37 35.5 41.18 40.7 43.4 33.3 40.0 32.3 39.6 
Acquirer Debt/Equity 118.3 48.1 124.8 50.23 84.1 37.72 106.4 40.5 69.6 30.9 77.5 48.1 
Earnout Value ($m) 26.7 26.7 25.5 25.5 32.3 32.3 11.2 11.2 41.7 41.7 52.4 52.4 
Rel. Earnout Value 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.36 
Continued 
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Continued (Table 2) 
 All Domestic CBA CBA Only  FTCBA NFTCBA New NFTCBA Same 
 All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. All Earn. 
 Panel C: Acquirer in Canada 
All Deals 3,702 258 2,111 97 1,591 161 473 44 320 34 798 83 
Unlisted Target 2,858 254 1,486 95 1,372 159 433 44 266 33 673 82 
Diversifying M&A 1,102 94 637 34 465 60 146 16 81 10 238 34 
Target in Intang. Sect. 1,301 161 689 58 612 103 191 26 90 19 331 58 
Target Common Law 3,196 218 2,111 97 1,085 121 327 35 169 12 589 74 
Deal Value ($m) 115.8 71.8 118.9 18.64 111.7 103.88 60.5 87.3 98.0 148.0 147.6 94.6 
Acquirer MV ($m) 1,286.3 2,631.0 1,043.9 169.66 1,608.1 4,113.96 183.8 378.7 1,561.1 3,380.3 2,471.1 6,394.6 
Relative Size 0.93 1.49 0.71 0.46 1.23 2.11 2.33 0.55 0.71 0.87 0.79 3.46 
MTBV 3.0 2.0 2.8 1.28 3.2 4.21 5.9 5.3 2.2 4.8 2.1 2.8 
Acquirer Age (years) 9.8 8.9 10.1 8.8 9.3 9.0 6.8 7.6 9.8 9.8 10.5 9.3 
Acquirer Net Margin 63.0 18.2 97.2 35.7 15.6 6.86 36.8 5.3 10.1 8.3 8.1 7.1 
Acquirer Cash Ratio 47.3 38.2 47.2 32.27 47.5 41.33 51.7 46.4 48.5 46.4 45.0 36.8 
Acquirer Debt/Equity 64.9 62.3 70.6 49.62 57.3 69.04 26.4 31.7 34.4 28.8 82.4 103.1 
Earnout Value ($m) 17.6 17.6 4.9 4.9 25.3 25.3 31.5 31.5 27.9 27.9 21.0 21.0 
Rel. Earnout Value 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 
 Panel D: Acquirer in Australia 
All Deals 2,365 242 1,797 156 568 86 211 36 149 20 208 30 
Unlisted Target 1,757 239 1,269 153 488 86 184 36 133 20 171 30 
Diversifying M&A 920 89 718 58 202 31 84 14 49 5 69 12 
Target in Intang. Sect. 971 133 768 85 203 48 81 18 49 10 73 20 
Target Common Law 2,179 212 1,797 156 382 56 144 20 85 11 153 25 
Deal Value ($m) 162.8 33.6 87.8 21.8 400.3 55.02 46.2 22.9 183.2 74.9 915.2 80.3 
Acquirer MV ($m) 1,057.1 300.6 812.6 158.13 1,830.9 559.07 189.3 97.9 2,406.6 1,030.3 3,083.7 798.3 
Relative Size 0.78 1.05 0.72 0.59 0.97 1.88 1.34 3.67 0.73 0.96 0.76 0.35 
MTBV 1.8 2.4 1.8 2.45 1.7 2.39 3.2 1.1 2.5 3.4 3.0 3.2 
Acquirer Age (years) 8.6 7.3 8.2 7.2 9.7 7.4 6.0 4.9 11.1 6.2 12.4 11.1 
Acquirer Net Margin 143.0 119.3 155.0 159.18 100.3 19.56 70.9 46.7 75.0 9.3 1,42.6 8.1 
Acquirer Cash Ratio 42.8 43.8 40.8 39.71 49.2 51.28 56.0 64.9 45.2 39.6 45.5 43.7 
Acquirer Debt/Equity 76.9 36.7 88.5 42.57 39.8 25.34 30.6 7.0 38.3 38.8 49.5 35.8 
Earnout Value ($m) 8.3 8.3 5.0 5.0 14.2 14.2 11.9 11.9 12.8 12.8 18.0 18.0 
Rel. Earnout Value 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of our sampled M&As announced by UK, US, Canadian and Australian acquirers. Panel A records statistics for M&As announced 
by acquirers based in the UK. Panel B records statistics for M&As announced by acquirers based in the US. Panel C records statistics for M&As announced by acquirers based 
in Canada. Panel D records statistics for M&As announced by acquirers based in Australia. The overall sample (All) is subdivided into domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
(CBA), with the CBA sample further sub-divided into three groups: First-time CBA (FTCBA), Not-First-Time CBA in a New Country (NFTCBA_NEW), and Not-First-Time 
CBA in the Same Country (NFTCBA_SAME). Summary statistics for core firm, deal and target home country characteristics are presented for all deals of a particular deal 
type and for earnout-financed deals only (Earn). Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the Appendix.  
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of main variables 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
CBA (1) 
                    
FTCBA (2) 0.48 
                   
NFTCBA_NEW (3) 0.51 -0.08 
                  
NFTCBA_SAME (4) 0.58 -0.09 -0.09 
                 
Earnout (5) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 
                
Relative Size (6) 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
               
Acquirer MTBV (7) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
              
Acquirer Age (8) 0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.17 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
             
Unlisted Target (9) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.17 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 
            
Diversifying M&A (10) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 
           
Target in Intangible Sector (11) -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.10 
          
Acquirer Cash Ratio (12) 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.19 -0.02 -0.14 0.12 
         
Acquirer Debt/Equity (13) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
        
Target Corporate Tax (14) -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.01 
       
Target Capital Control (15) -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.01 -0.13 
      
Target in Emerging Country (16) 0.37 0.19 0.24 0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 0.11 -0.01 -0.18 -0.17 
     
Common Language (17) -0.61 -0.25 -0.48 -0.23 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.13 0.08 -0.45 
    
Cultural Distance (CD) (18) 0.76 0.34 0.51 0.35 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.21 -0.09 0.62 -0.90 
   
Geographical Distance (GD) (19) 0.80 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.17 -0.04 0.39 -0.47 0.62 
  
Target Reg. Quality (RQ) (20) -0.40 -0.18 -0.26 -0.19 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.12 0.01 -0.09 0.23 -0.82 0.54 -0.66 -0.38 
 
Exchange Rate (21) -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.12 -0.03 -0.13 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.18 
Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between cross-border acquisitions (CBA), first-time CBA (FTCBA), not-first-time CBA in a new country 
(NFTCBA_NEW), not-first-time CBA in the same country as before (NFTCBA_SAME), and other variables used in the multivariate analysis in the paper. Variable definitions 
can be found in the Appendix.  
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Table 4 Univariate analysis of acquiring firm’s market-adjusted abnormal returns 
  
All 
 Payment Earnout 
Non-
Earnout 
All 
Payment Earnout 
Non-
Earnout 
All 
Payment Earnout 
Non-
Earnout 
All 
Payment Earnout 
Non-
Earnout 
  Panel A: Acquirer in UK Panel B: Acquirer in US Panel C: Acquirer in Canada Panel D: Acquirer in Australia 
All deals Mean 1.29*** 1.41*** 1.25*** 1.45*** 1.56*** 1.44*** 3.94*** 6.51*** 3.75*** 4.28*** 5.47*** 4.14*** N 7,701 1,931 5,770 18,080 1,694 16,386 3702 258 3444 2365 242 2123 
Domestic Acquisition Mean 1.33*** 1.59*** 1.24*** 1.49*** 1.44*** 1.50*** 3.38*** 8.47*** 3.13*** 3.93*** 4.22*** 3.91*** N 5,072 1,302 3,770 15,263 1,408 13,855 2,111 97 2014 1,797 156 1,641 
Cross-Border Acquisition 
(CBA) 
Mean 1.22*** 1.04*** 1.28*** 1.25*** 2.19*** 1.14*** 4.69*** 5.33*** 4.62*** 5.36*** 7.73** 4.94*** 
N 2,629 629 2,000 2,817 286 2,531 1,591 161 1430 568 86 482 
First Time CBA 
(FTCBA) 
Mean 1.75*** 2.53*** 1.49*** 2.05*** 3.01*** 1.93*** 5.73*** 7.36*** 5.56*** 7.86*** 10.20** 7.38*** 
N 448 112 336 981 107 874 473 44 429 211 36 175 
Not-First Time CBA 
in a new country (NFTCBA_NEW) 
Mean 1.27*** 0.78** 1.44*** 0.97*** 2.10*** 0.82*** 5.20*** 5.75*** 5.13*** 6.80*** 14.23 5.65*** 
N 887 221 666 1,055 125 930 320 34 286 149 20 129 
Not-First Time CBA 
in the same country (NFTCBA_SAME) 
Mean 1.00*** 0.67** 1.09*** 0.61*** 0.79 0.60*** 3.87*** 4.08*** 3.85*** 1.79*** 0.43 2.02*** 
N 1,294 296 998 781 54 727 798 83 715 208 30 178 
Notes: This table presents the mean firm value, as proxied by the announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A records statistics for 
M&As announced by acquirers based in the UK. Panel B records statistics for M&As announced by acquirers based in the US. Panel C records statistics for M&As announced 
by acquirers based in Canada. Panel D records statistics for M&As announced by acquirers based in Australia. In each panel, abnormal returns are presented according to the 
type of M&A: all deals, domestic deals, cross-border acquisitions (CBA), first-time CBA (FTCBA), not-first-time CBA in a new country (NFTCBA_NEW), not-first-time 
CBA in the same country as before (NFTCBA_SAME). Results are reported in the first column of each panel for the full sample (all payment), for earnout-financed deals, and 
for non-earnout deals. N refers to the sample size. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the t-test for equality of 
means. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the Appendix.  
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Table 5 The impact of global diversification and earnout financing on firm value (corrected for self-selection) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
CBA 0.002             
FTCBA  -0.001    -0.003   -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  
NFTCBA_NEW   0.004    0.003       
NFTCBA_SAME    0.001    0.001      
Earnout -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.006** 0.001 -0.003 -0.006* -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 0.013*** 
Earnout × CBA 0.002             
Earnout × FTCBA  0.014***    0.018**        
Earnout × NFTCBA_MEW   -0.003    -0.011**       
Earnout × NFTCBA_SAME    -0.004    -0.001      
Earnout × FTCBA × UNL_TRG         0.014**     
Earnout × FTCBA × CD          0.004**    
Earnout × FTCBA × GD           0.002**   
Earnout x FTCBA × RQ            0.010**  
Unlisted Target (UNL_TRG) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010 
Cultural Distance (CD)     -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
Geographical Distance (GD)     -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004 
Target Regulatory Quality (RQ)     0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.026** 
λCBA -0.007**             
λFTCBA  -0.007*    -0.003   -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003  
λNFTCBA_NEW   -0.004**    0.011       
λNFTCBA_SAME    0.009    -0.004      
λEARNOUT 0.002* 0.004*** 0.002* 0.006** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
Intercept 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.013 0.094** 0.095*** 0.075* 0.099** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.073 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Sq. 4.91 4.93 4.90 4.88 6.41 6.50 6.48 6.41 6.50 6.49 6.49 6.51 9.36 
F-Stat 95.71 96.04 95.71 95.50 15.40 14.20 14.17 14.00 14.20 14.19 14.18 14.24 5.64 
Mean VIF 1.64 1.32 1.37 2.03 2.25 2.44 2.22 2.25 2.44 2.10 2.11 2.44 2.34 
Number of Observations 26,245 26,245 26,245 26,245 4,519 4,519 4,519 4,519 4,519 4,519 4,519 4,519 1,114 
Notes: This table reports the results from the multivariate analysis on the acquirer abnormal returns of earnouts in M&As correcting for self-selection in the firm’s choice to 
conduct CBAs or not – and sub-groups in CBAs – (as opposed to domestic and remaining CBAs depending on whether the control group includes domestic deals or not) and 
in the firm’s choice to adopt earnout or not. The dependent variable consists of the acquirer 5-day CAR which is regressed against a set of explanatory variables. Controls 
include: deal relative size, acquirer age, acquirer MTBV, acquirer cash ratio, acquirer debt/equity ratio, acquirer net margin, diversifying M&A dummy, target in intangible 
sector dummy, target country capital control, exchange rate, target in emerging country dummy, target country corporate tax, and common language dummy. Variable definitions 
can be found in the Appendix. λ refers to the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from a Heckman two-stage model. Model 1 analyses the CBA and earnout effects for the whole sample, 
while models 2, 3 and 4 explore the differentials for FTCBA, NFTCBA_NEW and NFTCBA_SAME deals for the whole sample respectively. Models 5 to12 focus on the sub-
sample of CBAs, while Model 13 is restricted to the sample of FTCBAs. We include acquirer country, target industry, and year fixed effects. Regression outputs are estimated 
using OLS; the regression employs clustered standard errors based on the target's nation of origin to account for the correlation of country factors across observations (Petersen, 
2009). VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6 Univariate analysis (corrected for self-selection) 
 Panel A: Acquirer in UK Panel B: Acquirer in US Panel C: Acquirer in Canada Panel D: Acquirer in Australia 
 MR 1:1 MR 1:3 MR 1:5 MR 1:1 MR 1:3 MR 1:5 MR 1:1 MR 1:3 MR 1:5 MR 1:1 MR 1:3 MR 1:5 
 FTCBA 
Treated Group 2.59*** 2.59*** 2.59*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 7.67*** 7.67*** 7.67*** 12.49** 12.49** 12.49** 
N 102 102 102 94 94 94 40 40 40 30 30 30 
Control Group 0.09 1.11** 1.62*** 0.35 0.96** 1.37*** 0.52 1.83* 3.05*** 1.05 13.08** 11.25*** 
N 102 185 234 94 190 265 40 104 156 30 57 81 
Diff: Treated vs. Control 2.50*** 1.47** 0.97 2.45** 1.85** 1.44* 7.14*** 5.84*** 4.62** 11.44* -0.59 1.24 
 NFTCBA_NEW 
Treated Group 0.84** 0.84** 0.84** 1.99*** 1.99*** 1.99*** 5.74*** 5.74*** 5.74*** 14.23 14.23 14.23 
N 200 200 200 112 112 112 34 34 34 20 20 20 
Control Group 1.65*** 1.71*** 1.70*** 0.59 1.00** 0.88*** 8.06*** 6.91*** 6.77*** 6.29 4.76** 5.64*** 
N 140 296 389 88 224 344 31 83 109 17 40 57 
Diff: Treated vs. Control -0.81 -0.88* -0.86* 1.40* 0.99 1.11* -2.32 -1.17 -1.03 7.94 9.47 8.59 
 NFTCBA_SAME 
Treated Group 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 0.71** 4.08*** 4.08*** 4.08*** 0.56 0.56 0.56 
N 277 277 277 277 277 277 83 83 83 29 29 29 
Control Group 1.36*** 1.24*** 1.27*** 1.12*** 1.25*** 1.46*** 3.33** 3.91*** 4.27*** -0.28 1.09 0.73 
N 187 412 529 189 388 506 65 156 221 25 56 76 
Diff: Treated vs. Control -0.65 -0.53 -0.56 -0.41 -0.54 -0.75** 0.75 0.17 -0.19 -0.84 -0.53 -0.17 
Notes: This table presents the mean firm value, as proxied by the announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) acquirer cumulative abnormal returns using earnout financing (the 
Treated Group) and that of a Control Group of acquirers, virtually identical in all respects other than in the use of earnout financing, to those in the Treated (i.e., earnout-
financed) group. Each acquirer using earnout financing is matched to an acquirer (depending on the matching ratio) not using earnout financing using Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM). The PSM technique employs 1:1, 3:1 and 5:1 nearest neighbour matching ratios (MR), allowing for replacement. The Diff: Treated vs. Control captures the earnout 
effect, corrected for self-selection. Panel A records results for M&As announced by acquirers based in the UK. Panel B records results for M&As announced by acquirers based 
in the US. Panel C records results for M&As announced by acquirers based in Canada. Panel D records results for M&As announced by acquirers based in Australia. CBA 
refers to cross-border acquisitions, FTCBA refers to first-time CBA, NFTCBA_NEW refers to not-first-time CBA in a new country, NFTCBA_SAME refers to not-first-time 
CBA in the same country as before. N refers to the sample size. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the t-test for 
equality of means. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1 Frequency of Earnout Financing Activity Worldwide 
 
Notes: This figure reports the frequency of earnout activity worldwide, by acquirer country. The left-hand scale 
(and columns) report the absolute number of earnout-financed deals during 1992 to 2012 (inclusive), while the 
percentage of earnout activity to total M&A activity in the country adopting earnout financing is reported (with 
the continuous line) on the right-hand scale. The figure is restricted to countries with a minimum of five earnout-
financed deals during the sample period for deals that have survived the sample selection restrictions reported in 
section Data. Data obtained from the Thomson-Reuters SDC ONE Banker database. 
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